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JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CONDUCT COMMITTEES 
BARBARA REED" 
ROY A. SCHOTLAND" 
I. WHERE JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CONDUCT COMMITTEES FIT IN 
THE OVERALL PICTURE 
When all is said and debated about First Amendment limits on what 
regulation, if any, can be applied to judicial campaign conduct, three lessons 
stand out: 
A. Lesson One-Florida and Ohio's Approach 
The initial First Amendment decision against a canon limiting judicial 
campaign conduct was by a Florida federal district judge, striking a canon 
provision that said "a candidate ... should not make pledges or promises of 
conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of his duties 
... [or] announce his views on disputed legal or political issues .... ". 
That decision relied on the simplistic mantra that once a State decides to 
elect judges, judicial elections must be like other elections: "[W]hen a state 
decides that its trial judges are to be popularly elected ... it must recognize the 
candidates' right to make campaign speeches and the concomitant right ofthe 
public to be informed about the judicial candidates.,,2 Subsequently, the stricken 
provision was revised. The same provision had been upheld six years earlier by 
an Ohio federal district court judge, and subsequently affirmed by the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.3 These decisions were not even cited by the Florida 
federal judge. But that is only the beginning-and by far the lesser part of the 
lesson, which is: Florida and Ohio have done the most to preempt, and if 
necessary take steps against, inappropriate judicial campaign conduct. Their 
effort is described below. 
Given that Florida experienced a notable decision invalidating their effort to 
• Counsel and Policy Director, The Constitution Project. This Paper was prepared 
specifically for the Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment. The 
views expressed in this Paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or 
opinions of the National Center for State Courts, the Joyce Foundation, or the Open Society 
Institute. Supported (in part) by a grant from the Program on Law & Society ofthe Open Society 
Institute, as well as a grant from the Joyce Foundation. 
•• Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1. FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(I)(c) (1994). 
2. ACLU v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D. Fla. 1990) (emphasis in original). 
Neither party requested oral argument in this decision for a preliminary injunction, id. at 1095, and 
the Bar did not appeal the court's granting of a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of 
Canon 7(B)(i)(c). [d. at 1199. (A retrospective note: counsel for the Bar was Barry Richard, lead 
counsel for George W. Bush in Florida during 2000 election dispute.). In 1991, a permanent 
injunction against the Canon was issued. 
3. Bergerv. SupremeCourtofOhio~ 598 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984),aff'd, 861 F.2d 719 
(6th Cir. 1988). 
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limit judicial campaign conduct, and Ohio experienced a completely opposite 
decision, it is striking that it is those two States that are unique in having 
substantial, structured efforts to pre-empt and prevent misconduct in judicial 
campaigns.4 These two systems, in place since the mid-1990s, are a model for 
action. Moreover, the Florida experience shows that, whatever one's view of 
how the First Amendment affects attempts to limit inappropriate judicial 
campaign conduct, it does not stop effective, aggressive efforts. 
Florida's effort, begun in 1998, is carried out by the State's Judicial Ethics 
Advisory Committee ("JEAC") made up of ten judges (including a rotating 
chairperson) and one attorney, with staff support. The JEAC renders "advisory 
opinions to inquiringjudges [on] the propriety of contemplated judicial and non-
judicial conduct."s Starting with the 1998 elections, the JEAC has performed 
two functions. For the 1998 and 2000 elections, it conducted campaign conduct 
forums in every circuit with a contested judicial election (fifteen forums in 1998, 
sixteen in 2000), for candidates and campaign consultants. Every forum is 
attended by the chief judge of the particular circuit and a high-ranking 
representative ofthe bar. Their "course" material-with a cover page declaring 
"Play by the Rules . .. or else ... ,'06 is already serving as a model for other 
States.' The JEAC's Election Practices Subcommittee provides quick responses 
to campaign questions; in addition to informal responses, opinions are posted 
promptly on a website. Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court, newly empowered 
by recent constitutional revision, last year removed a judge from office because 
of his misconduct in a campaign.B 
Ohio's Supreme Court revised its canon in 1995 to start a two-part effort to 
limit inappropriate judicial campaign conduct. First, early in each campaign, 
year, all judicial candidates are required to complete a two-hour course on 
campaign conduct and finance, to which "candidates are encouraged to bring 
campaign committee members and othervolunteers,',9 Second, the court's "rules 
4. Nevada will have a similar effort active for 2002. And for recent action in Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and New York, see infra notes 35-36 and infra text accompanying notes 32-33. 
5. Pet. of the Comm. on Standards of Conduct for Judges, 327 So~ 2d 5 (Fla. 1976). The 
committee name was changed to JEAC in 1997. Pet. of the Comm. on Standards of Judges, 698 
So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1997). 
6. See Appendix A, infra, for a few pages of their material. 
7. For 2002, the JEAC is considering reducing the number of forums by regional izing them. 
Also, it may hold the forums earlier than before. They were held in late July, immediately after the 
formal filing date for candidates, but that is too close to the September primary, which in fact is the 
final election for almost all judicial candidates, and it comes after some significant campaigning. 
8. Inquiry re Matthew E. McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2001). Charges included "(I) 
making explicit campaign promises to favor the State and the police in court proceedings; (2) 
making explicit promises that he would side against the defense; (3) making unfounded attacks on 
an incumbent county judge; (4) making unfounded attacks on the local court system and local 
officials .... " ld. at 562. 
9. Richard A. Dove, Judicial Campaign Conduct: Rules, Education, and Enforcement, 34 
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1447, 1456 (2001). Prepared for the December 2000 Chief Justices' Summit, 
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governing judicial discipline [include] expedited procedures for reviewing and 
resolving judicial campaign complaints."lo Of the eleven actions that have gone 
through Ohio's process, seven resulted in either a preliminary finding or final 
order before the election, and the "slowest" action took five months after the 
misconduct occurred. I I 
B. Lesson Two-Enforcement Is Rare 
Wholly apart from possible First Amendment hurdles that prevent or inhibit 
enforcement of canon provisions limiting campaign conduct, the unsavory fact 
is that although enforcement has been active in a handful of States (and 
localities), in many or most places enforcement is rare, and fear of enforcement 
is little or none. Moreover, much campaign conduct defies any view that judicial 
campaigns should be above the gutter, let alone different from other campaigns. 
Finally, what keeps most judicial campaigning different from other campaigning 
is a combination of the norms for such campaigns, which rest on the candidates' 
professional ism, respect for the bench, and concern to protect the public's respect 
for the bench and the fact that in so many campaigns, the norms are not tested by 
significant-or even any-competition. 
We may all point with alarm to problematic advertisements in 2000; 12 
however, while earlier years were quieter, there were undeniable indications that 
the system was vulnerable. 
C. Last Lesson-Judicial Campaign Conduct Committees Bridge the Gap 
Campaign conduct oversight committees-some of which are official, some 
quasi-official, and some unofficial committees of diverse community 
leaders-can make a major difference in curbing inappropriate judicial campaign 
conduct. First, at the outset of campaigns, they can educate candidates about 
why judicial campaigns are different, and therefore what kinds of conduct are 
deemed inappropriate. Second, during campaigns, oversight committees can be 
available to respond to candidate requests for advice. They can receive 
complaints about conduct deemed inappropriate, or even take the initiative to try 
to discourage or stop such conduct. They can also reach out to non-candidate 
groups (political parties, political leaders and the variety of civic groups that may 
be active injudicial campaigns) to try to discourage advertising or other conduct 
that, in the view of the committee, is inappropriate. Finally, at any time, so long 
Dove's article provides all the information regarding the Ohio committees, as well as that for other 
States. 
10. ld. at 1463. 
II. Id. at 1463-64. In addition to the expedited process, a complaint may go on the "normal 
track," with an investigation by the Supreme Court's disciplinary counsel. One matter was pursued 
by disciplinary counsel on that track after the complaint had been dismissed, post-election, by the 
candidates who had filed it. 
12. See Anthony Champagne, Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV. 669 
(2002). 
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as they act only after fully fair process, they can present to the public their views 
of why certain conduct is inappropriate. 
A few such committees (for example, unofficial local ones, initiated by local 
bar associations) have been active for over a decade. 13 Then, starting in 1995 in 
Ohio, spreading in 1998, and with the trend strengthening since, official and 
other committees have emerged. We consider here the types of problems such 
committees can act upon; the three types of committees: official, quasi-official 
and unofficial; the strengths and weaknesses of each type, and the inherent 
weaknesses of all such efforts; concluding with recommendations for future 
action. 
II. THE PROBLEMS ON WHICH SUCH COMMITTEES CAN ACT 
So far, campaign conduct committees have dealt only with problematic 
advertisements, and that is bound to remain their main or sole focus. But as we 
note briefly below, committees should seriously consider the possibility of not 
ignoring problematic campaign finance conduct. Problematic ads fall into three 
main categories: factual misstatements; "signaling" and near-promises; and 
attack ads. At their most innocent, attack ads state accurate, but negative, facts 
about the opponent; at their most damaging, they assail judges for specific 
decisions in which they participated, or attack lawyers for specific clients they 
represented, and/or engage in misrepresentation or falsehood. 
Professor Champagne provides an unprecedented picture of judicial 
campaign ads, 14 and there seems little or no need for more examples of campaign 
conduct that almost all of us would call undesirable, and many of us seek to stop. 
However, while unquestionably 2000's judicial campaigns were dimensionally 
different from previous years, no one should think such conduct is new. IS 
Judicial campaign conduct committees could also help preempt or discourage 
campaign finance practices that, though legal, are damaging deviations from the 
community's norms. Examples of the practices include: An incumbent is 
believed to be engaging in raising campaign funds in ways that may not be a 
provable violation of the ban on personal solicitation; a challenger, acting as if 
she wi 11 run for a nonjudicial office, begins fundraising before the period allowed 
for judicial campaign fundraising-and then announces her candidacy for a 
judicial race, offering to return funds to any contributor who wishes; and an 
incumbent justice, in ajurisdiction which limits individual contributions but does 
) 3. See Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: A re State Judges' Robes 
the Emperor's Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 L.J. & POL. 57, 91-93 n.92, 128-29 (1985). 
14. Champagne, supra note 12. 
15. In addition to the 2000 elections' ads examined in Professor Champagne's paper, earlier 
horrors are noted in Schotland, supra note 13, at 66, 79-80, and in Choosing Justices: Reforming 
the Selection of State Judges, in UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS IN AMERICA'S COURTS 77, 101-02 
(2000). The 2000 campaigns are examined (mainly as to campaign finance) in Roy A. Schotland, 
Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 
849. 
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not impose any aggregate limit on law firms, raises an unprecedented proportion 
of his funds from a single firm, its members, employees and their spouses, and 
the firm's PAC. Moreover, the contributions are received just before the justice 
votes to review a verdict which awarded record damages, and the contributing 
firm had a one-third contingency interest in the matter. 16 
No existing campaign conduct committee has taken on campaign finance 
problems. However, campaign contribution and spending patterns in judicial 
races should do more than merely abide by legal limits: candidates should adhere 
to the jurisdiction's norms or else be ready to account to the public for deviating 
from the norms. 
III. THE THREE TYPES OF COMMITTEES; THEIR POWERS, PROCEDURES, 
AND MEMBERS 
A. Official Committees 
Along with the official committees established in Florida and Ohio, 17 at least 
two other states have also adopted an official committee model. 
1. Georgia's Approach.-In late 1997, Georgia's Judicial Qualifications 
Commission ("JQC"), the official body responsible for judicial discipline, 
adopted a rule establishing a three-person special committee to oversee campaign 
conduct (in Georgia, judges run in nonpartisan, contestable elections). This step 
reflected concern about a troublesome 1996 campaign for an intermediate 
appellate seat. The committee's members are, by rule, the senior member of each 
of the three categories of JQC members: one private attorney, one judge and one 
"lay person," plus the JQC's full-time director as an ex officio member. The 
initial members were the JQC's chairman, a lawyer, an intermediate appellate 
judge, and a prominent businessman. 
The committee's sole power is to issue statements. It may do so after an 
expedited but thorough process (of course, affording to the candidate complained 
against an opportunity to respond), either upon complaint or on its own initiative. 
This procedure was upheld as constitutional by a federal district court in 2000, 
although the court also upheld a facial challenge to the particular provision in 
Georgia's canon. 18 
16. This is a ninety-percent-Iiteral statement of the conduct of two Ohio Supreme Court 
justices in 1998. They voted as the firm had hoped. The defendant's motion for recusal was never 
ruled upon. Wightman v. Conso!. Rail Corp., 715 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio 1999), cen. denied, 529 U.S. 
1012 (2000). The facts are set forth in Roy A. Schotland, Campaign Finance in Judicial Elections, 
34 LOv. L.A. L. REv. 1489, 1503-04 (2001). 
17. The Florida committee was established in 1998 and the Ohio committee in 1995. See 
supra Part l.A. . 
18. The court upheld the system as one that "offers the constitutionally preferred cure of more 
speech. The Rule does not give the Special Committee the power to censor or prohibit speech, to 
impose fines or other criminal sanctions, or to institute or prosecute disciplinary actions. It only 
allows the Special Committee to make a public statement." Weaver v. Bonner, 114 F. Supp. 2d 
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2. Nevada's Approach.-In 1997, Nevada's Supreme Court established a 
Standing Committee on Judicial Ethics and Election Practices, which serves as 
the appellate body for judicial discipline cases, renders advisory opinions to 
judges throughout the year, and adjudicates disputes between candidates, whether 
they are already judges or not. The Standing Committee has twenty-eight 
members, with four judges appointed by the court, twelve lawyers appointed by 
the state bar, and twelve "public members" appointed by the governor (but these 
twelve do not participate in the non-election advisory opinion process). They 
have strong staff support through the state bar's general counsel/executive 
director. 
The Committee divides into five-person panels to handle complaints. 
Initiated for the first time in 2002, and before candidates formally file for 
election, the Committee will provide "proactive and advance education ... to 
hold down complaints and avoid violations." 
B. Quasi-official Committees: Alabama, Michigan and South Dakota19 
In February 1998, the Alabama Supreme Court appointed a twelve-person 
"Judicial Campaign Oversight Committee," all private citizens, including 
non lawyers with reputations for the "utmost integrity." The twelve members 
were appointed by the Alabama Supreme Court, two other courts and the Circuit 
Judges' Association. The 1998 members included a homemaker, a businessman, 
two retired judges, an active judge, a member of the clergy, a mayor, a lawyer 
and former congressman, a farmer, a prosecutor, a public service leader, a 
campaign manager, and another lawyer (who was the chair of the court's 
Standing Committee on Rules of Conduct and Canons of Judicial Ethics). In 
2000, the Committee was expanded to twenty-six members, all lawyers and 
judges appointed by the supreme court. 
In 1998, as a result of increased complaints throughout the 1996 campaign 
cycle, the Michigan bar2° created five five-person regional panels, made up of 
lawyers and non lawyers, to oversee campaign conduct issues; they offered all 
1337. 1345-46 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (citations omitted). See also Robert M. O'Neil, The Canons in the. 
Courts: Recent First Amendment Rulings, 35. IND. L. REv. 701, 705-07 (2002). 
19. In February 1998, the South Dakota Supreme Court ordered that 
candidates must complete a two-hour course on campaign practices, finance, and ethics 
sponsored and approved by the Judicial Qualifications Commission; (2) in every year 
with a circuit court election, a Special Committee on Judicial Election Campaign 
Intervention shall be created ... to issue advisory opinions and to deal expeditiously 
with allegations of ethical misconduct in campaigns for judicial office. 
The committee consists of five persons: two former members of the JQC appointed by the JQC 
chair; two former members of the state bar's disciplinary board, appointed by its chair; and a retired 
judge or justice appointed by the chief justice. The members of the JQC and Special Committee, 
and their counsel and staff, have absolute immunity for acts in the course of duty. See Appendices 
to SDCL 12-9 and 16-1A. 
20. Michigan is a mandatory bar State. 
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candidates in contested judicial elections the opportunity to participate in the 
oversight program.21 If a candidate did not participate, a panel could still 
investigate allegations of "false, misleading, unfair, unethical or illegal 
statements" and make public comment and/or refer the matter to the Attorney 
Grievance Commission or the Judicial Tenure Commission. 
In the 1998 primary elections for Michigan trial judges, there were 101 
uncontested races and sixty-one contested races with 121 candidates, eighty-four 
of whom participated in the oversight program. Of the general election's ninety-
four candidates, sixty-nine participated. During the primary, the panels reviewed 
only one inquiry, which resulted in the candidate's agreement to alter conduct. 
The general election produced six requests for action, four of which were 
dismissed and two that resulted in immediate agreements to alter conduct. 
Although the bar endorsed continuation of the panels for 2000, they were not 
continued. . 
C. Unofficial Committees 
Unofficial committees have existed for more than a decade in some local ities 
and are currently employed in eighteen localities over five states. Moreover, 
North Carolina and Ohio have each, on single occasions, employed the unofficial 
committee model. 
In 1990 in North Carolina, a state bar association committee chairman 
formed a committee that sponsored debates on public television between 
statewide candidates, and also published 550,000 copies of a voters' pamphlet 
on judicial candidates (after raising nearly $50,000 to subsidize the pamphlet's 
creation) distributed shortly before the election in the main Sunday newspapers. 
The committee included former Chief Justice Rhoda Billings and a former 
justice, plus some twelve citizens who were diverse in gender, geography, 
ethnicity, and professions, but all of whom were leaders or representatives of 
notable community groups. The committee began its efforts at the end of August 
and was ready to receive and respond to campaign complaints, but none were 
submitted (in fact, the only problematic conduct was by one of the state party 
chairmen). 
During 1992, a similar effort was initiated in Ohio by members of a 
Columbus campaign oversight group that had been functioning in Franklin 
County for several election cycles. The State Committee of Citizens, chaired by 
21. For a valuable report, see Thomas K. Byerley, Judicial Campaign Ethics Experiment, 
MICH. B. J. 318 (March 1999). Byerley serves as regUlation counsel for the Michigan State Bar, 
and notes that 
one major concern [leading to the effort] was that there was no prompt way to address 
allegedly improPer campaign tactics .... [A]n "aggrieved" candidate could only file a 
complaint [and] the investigations ... took considerable time .... Even if a candidate 
violated ethics rules during the campaign, many times no discipline was ultimately 
imposed .... As with any experimental program, lessons were learned .... 
Id. at 318, 319. 
HeinOnline -- 35 Ind. L. Rev. 788 2001-2002
788 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:781 
a former federal district judge, had the same goals as the North Carolina effort 
noted above. However, the State Committee of Citizens collapsed after it failed 
to secure agreement from supreme court candidates on limiting campaign 
contributions and spending-each candidate was willing to limit one but not the 
other. . 
In 1985 in Columbus, Ohio, the county bar president initiated an oversight 
committee oflawyers and nonlawyers. The committee succeeded in stopping one 
advertisement that stated, "Elect Judge X" although X had never been a judge, 
and another ad that attacked a candidate for having represented a particular 
criminal defendant. The committee chairman was the local Catholic bishop, who 
had been a lawyer earlier in his career. The committee, now known locally as the' 
"Bishop's Committee," still exists, with eleven members appointed by the county 
bar president (with the consent of the bar's board of governors). Of the eleven 
members, three must be non lawyers, and not more than five may be from one 
political party. Before taking any action or releasing any statement, the 
committee must have seven votes in favor of such a course. Cleveland and 
Youngstown have recently begun similar efforts. 
In addition, San Mateo County, California, has had such a committee since 
approximately 1980;22 similar committees can be found in Santa Clara County, 
California, and King County (Seattle), Washington. In Florida, the Miami-Dade 
bar association has an active committee. Five other Florida counties have 
committees of which we learned only at the completion of this Paper: Broward, 
Escambia-Santa Rosa, Orange, Palm Beach, and Volusia.23 
New York moved dramatically on this matter in 2001. New York's pioneer 
is the Erie County (Buffalo) bar, which around 1985 started a committee of three 
board members plus the board's chairman. Each member serves for three years. 
An effort is made to appoint lawyers with a background in professional ethics or 
judicial campaigns. And in 2000, the Monroe County (Rochester) bar resumed 
an effort it had made in the mid-1980s; the committee consists of several bar 
officers.24 
D. Two Additional Factors 
1. What Some Committees Have Done .-After Alabama's 1998 election, the 
Judicial Campaign Oversight Committee submitted a full report to the court, 
noting its outreach efforts which brought candidates together (many opponents 
had not met before); that most candidates signed pledges;2S and that it responded 
to 350 inquiries and referred about ten complaints to the state bar or judicial 
inquiry commission. "A nicer election," the Birmingham News editorialized on 
November 9, 1998. "Overall ... it was a much cleaner campaign than in 
22. For the entire San Mateo plan, see Schotland, supra note 13, at 91-93. 
23. Information on whom to contact in all six counties can be provided by the authors ofthis 
Article. 
24. See infra text accompanying notes 32-33. 
25. See infra Part 11.0.2. 
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previous years.,,26 
In 2000, an enlarged committee received about thirty complaints or inquiries; 
however, they did not submit a report. Strikingly, although five supreme court 
seats were contested with such intensity that over $13 million was spent, and a 
major litigation arose over one campaign ad, Alabama was dramatically more 
decorous than lIIinois, Michigan, and Ohio, which had similar hotly-contested 
races.27 
2. Candidate Pledges.-Many committees of all three types ask candidates 
to sign pledges. Michigan's 1998 state bar effort secured pledges from nearly 
seventy percent of the primary election candidates and seventy-three percent in 
the general election.28 The Alabama and the Columbus citizens' comm ittees have 
very detailed pledges; the latter even defines how the phrases ''jury trial 
experience," ''trial experience," "litigation experience," "appellate experience," 
and "administrative hearing experience" may be used in campaign literature. The 
Santa Clara bar committee's pledge simply asks candidates to agree to abide by 
the bar's Judicial Election Campaign Code of Ethics, which contains specific 
guidelines. The New York bar committees all use pledges; Seattle's pledge is a 
perfunctory paragraph. Nevada does not use a pledge. Obviously, committees 
using pledges believe them to be helpful. One ofthe authors recommends the use 
of pledges, the other feels the need for more information on how they are used. 
One major benefit of using pledges is that it presents a benchmark against which 
the voting public may measure candidate conduct as the campaign progresses; it 
provides an opportunity to hold candidates' feet to the fire if they fail to comply. 
A major criticism cited by opponents of pledges is that they may be perceived as 
coercive, preventing candidates from campaigning according to their own 
preferences. 
IV. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF EACH COMMITTEE TYPE 
An inherent strength of any type of campaign oversight comm ittee described 
here is that if inappropriate judicial campaign conduct occurs, the voters will 
hear from diverse, respected, knowledgeable, and neutral people. Indeed, the 
committee's mere existence is likely to help inhibit improper conduct; and ifany 
does occur, committee members can give the public an informed, detached 
analysis. 
An inherent weakness in these comm ittees is the tendency that people wi IIing 
to undertake responsibility for such an effort,may tend to have unrealistically 
high aspirations for what constitutes proper conduct. This weakness can be met 
26. Editorial, A Nicer Election in Judicial Races, No Repeat of 1996's Tacky Campaign, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 9, 1998, at 6A. 
27. However, one supreme court candidate in 2000, Lyn Stuart, let voters know that she had 
sentenced two convicted murderers to death, that she had a ninety-one percent conviction rate in 
DUI cases, that she had a twenty year record in fighting crime as both a prosecutor and judge and 
that "she respects law enforcement." 
28. See Byerley, supra note 21, at 319. 
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by a well-structured appointment process. We recognize that the inherent 
strength of these committees will, for some people, seem insufficient unless it 
includes the power to stop improper conduct. However, the existence of such 
committees is an essential step toward protecting long~standing values that are 
not merely fundamental but are also crucial to allowing our state courts to 
continue to render justice-specifically, judicial independence and 
accountabi I ity. 
Official committees have the advantage of durability, resources, and the 
potency that comes with the potential for official sanctions for misconduct. 
However, those undeniable advantages are outweighed by two factors that are 
inseparable from the advantages. One is the certainty that official action is 
limited by requirements of the First Amendment and due process. Unofficial 
action, of course, also must be procedurally fair, but unofficial action is free of 
constitutional limits.29 The second advantage of unofficial committees is the 
greater credibility that comes with a diverse membership in a voluntary 
body-members who are selected precisely because they are respected and 
neutral voices.30 In the unofficial context, such members are more likely to be 
regarded as respected and neutral, rather than as purely political appointees 
charged with protecting favorites. On balance, we favor unofficial committees 
for this role. 
CONCLUSION 
Three recent events, taken together, constitute the strongest possible 
recommendation for bar associations to initiate campaign conduct committees. 
The December 2000 Summit of State Chief Justices recommended that: 
"Non-governmental monitoring groups should be established to encourage fair 
and ethical judicial campaigns.")' As a direct result, in March 2001, New York's 
Administrative Board of the Courts adopted a new rule that all judicial 
candidates (lawyers and judges) have the same campaign conduct 
29. Even official action is reviewed more favorably if it chooses "the constitutionally 
preferred cure of more speech." See Weaver v. Bonner, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 
2000). 
30. In an Ohio Supreme Court election in 2000, the U.S. and Ohio Chambers of Commerce 
ran what became the most controversial television ads of 2000's unprecedentedly heated campaigns. 
A press conference to attack the attack ads was held by the state bar's president. There is no reason 
to question that individual's reputation for integrity, but we note that as a member of a large law 
firm, he happened to have as partners the then-president of the Trial Lawyers' Association and a 
partner who was then a member ofthe official state election commission, where he was active in 
trying to have the commission act against those same ads. We believe that media efforts, and 
discussions aimed at making it unnecessary to "go public," are likely to be more effective if 
conducted by a panel of diverse community leaders whose efforts cannot easily be dismissed as 
those of insiders whose agenda is to protect themselves and their colleagues. 
31. Summit on Improving Judicial Selection, Call To Action, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1352, 
1356 (200 I) [hereinafter Call To Action]. 
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responsibilities.32 The Board also formally 
endorsed the establishment and maintenance by statewide and local bar 
associations of judicial election campaign practices committees that, as 
part of the bar associations' process of evaluating candidates for judicial 
office, request candidates to provide written commitments that they will 
campaign in· accordance with the requirements of the Code . . . 
applicable case law and ethics opinions .... 
791 
Further, the Board urged the chief judge and chief administrative judge to meet 
with bar representatives. In June 200 I, Chief Administrative Judge Jonathan 
Lippman announced this effort, and by October, when the New York Law Journal 
placed on its front page an article about a meeting of judges and bar officials, 
several counties had started new committees, joining the existing committees in 
Erie and Monroe Counties.33 In one judicial district, each county has a local 
committee (most were founded recently), and also has a delegate on a district-
wide "super-committee" to address problems in district-wide races that cross 
county lines. 
Similarly, in April 2000, Louisiana's Supreme Court named an Ad Hoc 
Committee to Study the Creation of a Judicial Campaign Oversight Committee. 
Co-chaired by Chief Justice Pascal Calogero and retired Judge Graydon 
Kitchens, the Committee met with Alabama lawyer Mark White, who had 
spearheaded the Alabama effort, and held a public hearing. In 2001, the 
Committee recommended creation of a permanent oversight committee, to 
"benefit the citizens of Louisiana by: (1) Serving as a resource for judges and 
judicial candidates; (2) Educating judges and judicial candidates about ethical 
campaign conduct; and (3) Helping deter unethical judicial campaign conduct.,,34 
In March 2002, the Louisiana Supreme Court established such a committee 
on the Alabama model.35 And in April 2002, the Mississippi Supreme Court also 
acted, establishing a committee on the Georgia model.36 
Fully recognizing that of course the right course of action varies to fit each 
jurisdiction, and particularly, that special steps may be needed for statewide 
elections, we urge the following action regarding the creation and work of 
32. See Appendix B, infra. 
33. John Caber, Judicial Election Reform Sought in Campaign for Bench: State Joins 
National Pushfor Greater Civility, 226 N.Y. LJ. 1 (2001). The other two counties that already 
had committees are Monroe (Rochester) and Onondaga. One of the leaders of these new 
movements is Craig Landy, head of the New York County Lawyers' Association and an active 
participant at the Summit. The New York State Bar Association, headed by Steven Krane, is 
spearheading efforts at the county level to establish oversight committees, and will act as a 
clearinghouse forthese efforts. Copies of each bar's basic materials are available from the authors. 
34. AD HOC COMM. TO STUDY THE CREA T10~ OF A JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN OVERSIGHT COMM., 
REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF LoUISIANA 3 (2000). Copies of that report can be obtained 
from the authors. 
35. LA. SUP. CT. R. 3S. 
36. In re Miss. Code of Judicial Conduct, 2002 Miss. LEXIS 124, Canon SeE), 5(F) and cmt. 
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judicial campaign oversight committees. 
First, while we believe the need for such committees is acute and the 
contribution that these committees can bring is large, we also believe that, on 
balance, such committees will be more effective if they are unofficial rather than 
official. Any committee must be fair and deliberate, but unofficial committees 
cannot be sued (which sometimes is done for pUblicity) on constitutional 
grounds.37 Second, bar associations, as the. most naturally interested bodies, 
should take steps to establish campaign conduct committees. Such steps should 
be taken as early as possible prior to the commencement of an election year so 
that the committee will be in place, and able to begin its work, before campaigns 
(including primaries) begin. 
Whether or not a committee is established for statewid~ elections, state bar 
associations should, as in New York, serve as central sources for information on 
the applicable rules of conduct. Similarly, the National Center for State Courts 
should serve as a central source of information. By compiling and sharing their 
different experiences in creating judicial campaign oversight committees, bar 
associations can only be better served in their efforts to further the work of such 
committees. 
Third, such committees must have by-laws describing their functions and 
membership, and prescribing procedures (including their approach to 
confidentiality). The National Center for State Courts should serve as a 
clearinghouse for "best-practice" examples. Finally, a number of factors should 
be considered when creating committees. Asan initial matter, while the initiative 
to create such committees comes naturally from bar associations, the committee's 
balance and credibility will be far greater if the committee includes non-lawyers. 
In the words of the Alabama Supreme Court's order creating such a body, 
committees should comprise of persons who have reputations in the community 
for the "utmost integrity," and who are diverse community organization leaders 
or representatives. There should be at least as many non-lawyer committee 
members as lawyers, with co-chairs or the members choosing a chair.38 
Additionally, given that the purpose of the committee is to encourage 
37. Such committees should distinguish themselves from any other unofficial groups that may 
hold themselves out as "campaign ethics committees," but are parts of groups pursuing substantive 
agendas, e.g., special interest groups, including the business lobby, organized labor, religious and 
social policy groups, etc. 
38. New Jersey has no judicial elections, but to meet widespread concerns about its judicial 
selection process-in which, in operation, senators have a veto over nominations from their own 
district-one senator has established the Morris County Selection Committee to identify and screen 
candidates for the bench. 
That committee has five non-lawyers chosen by the county's two senators, five attorneys 
chosen by the county bar, and a chair chosen by the committee members. This process has worked 
very well. See Robert J. Martin, Reinforcing New Jersey's Bench: Power Toolsfor Remodeling 
Senatorial Courtesy and Refinishing Judicial Selection and Retention, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 1,63· 
69 (2000). In May 2001, the state bar recommended such committees for all counties. NEW JERSEY 
STATE BAR Assoc., IMPROVING THE JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS 10 (2000). 
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appropriate conduct in judicial campaigns, the committee should decide whether 
its mission is limited to advertisements, statements and similar matters, or 
includes campaign finance practices; and what forms of action it may take. 
Likewise, the committee or its creators should determ ine whether it possesses the 
power to initiate a discussion about what it deems inappropriate action, or only 
to act upon an external complaint. 
Educating candidates and campaign staff would also be beneficial; the 
National Center for State Courts could serve as a clearinghouse for curricula. In 
addition to education for candidates and campaign staff, it would be valuable for 
members to maintain contact with leaders of civic organizations (and in some 
States, political parties) that may participate in judicial campaigns. Similarly, 
asking candidates to sign pledges, as many committees do, is recommended by 
one of the authors, while the other feels the need for more information on how 
they are used. 
"Hotlines" to provide campaign advice exist in several jurisdictions, and 
were recommended by the 2000 Summit.39 Finally, experience makes clear that 
during the weeks immediately before an election, it may be necessary to have a 
"rapid response" panel or executive committee on call to respond to immediate 
campaign concerns. 
In sum, as the other papers presented at this Symposium make abundantly 
clear, the problems associated with inappropriate statements and conduct during 
judicial elections are unlikely to abate anytime soon. Bench and bar leaders 
across the country are beingjoined by a growing chorus of members ofthe media 
and the public in demands that something be done. As an initial step that 
requires relatively little yet holds great promise, the authors endorse the use of 
judicial campaign conduct committees as a means of long-term improvement. 
39. Call To Action, supra note 31, at 1355-56. 
H
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Alabama 
Type Appointed by supreme COUll 
Membership In 1998, twelve lawyers and non-
lawyers; in 2000, twenty-six judges 
and lawyers 
Since 1998 
Fonnsof -Ou1reaCh to candidates; 
Action -Hotline; 
-Receives complaints; 
.(;an initiate investigations and 
actions; 
.(;an refer to disciplinary 
bodies; and 




Table 1: Summary on Judicial Campaign Conduct Committees 
(lbe authors can furnish contact infonnation on committees in each state) 
Florida Georgia Michigan Nevada 
Official Official Mandatory bar Supreme CoUll's 
Official Standing 
Committee on Judicial 
Ethics 
Judicial Ethics Advisory Special Committee of Five regional Twenty-eight 
Committee Judicial Qualification panels, each members' 
Commission comprised of five 
Staff: Senior attorney in State lawyers and non- Staff: Executive 
Courts Administration Staff: Director of JQC lawyers director is the exec. 
dirJgeneral counsel of 
Staff: Bar's the Constitutional 
"regulation Commission (for 
counsel" judicial discipline) 
1998 1998 1998 only 1997 
-Educates candidates; -Rec:eives complaints; -Hotline; -Educates; and 
-Hotline; and .(;an initiate -Receives -Hotline. 
.(;an refer to disciplinary investigations and complaints; and 
bodies . actions; .(;an refer to 
.(;an make public disciplinary 
statements; and bodies 




Bar associations Official' 
Committees of lawyers Special panel of 
(some also have non- judges 
lawyers) 
Staff: Disciplinary 
Counsel of Sup. CI. 
2001' 1995 
Various, for a few long- -Education 
standing committees; (mandatory for 
however, most candidates); 
committees are just -Hotline; 
beginning -Receives 
complaints;" 
.(;an make public 
statements, if 
"probable cause" 







'In addition, unofficial citizens' (county) committees were fonned in Columbus, Cleveland and Youngstown. Columbus's goes back to 1985. Such committees are recognized by the supreme coUll rules, which 
provide for referring to such committees any complaints involving candidates who have voluntarily signed an agreement with such a committee. 
"In the ... period involving more than 100 separate judicial campaigns, only one fonnal campaign complaint has arisen from these counties." Richard A. Dove, Judicial Campaign Conduct: Rules, Education and 
Enforcement, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1447, 1461 (2001). 
b Four judges appointed by supreme COUll, twelve lawyers appointed by state bar, and twelve "public members" appointed by governor, who do not participate in the committee's non-election advisory opinion work. 





















einOnline -- 35 Ind. L. Rev. 795 2001-2002
APPENDIX A 
FLORIDA JUDICIAL ETHICS CAMPAIGN FORUM 
Judicial Ethics 
Campaign Forum 
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Welcomes & Introductions 
• Chief judge welcome & introductions. 
• A message from Chief Justice Charles T. Wells. 
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Your Responsibilities 
• Compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
• Compliance with Florida Statutes. 
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Is It Ethical? 
The Common Sense Approach: 
• Some questions you may want to ask yourself? 
- Would you do it in front of your mother? 
- Will it hurt or harm your reputation? 
- Will the conduct promote public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary? 
- How will it appear on the front page of The Miami 
Herald or El Nuevo Herald! 
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Are Ethics Important? 
. To be ethical, you have to 
be willing to lose. 
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The "Doctrine" of Relative Filth 
"I'lU not so bad as long as there 
are people who are worse." 
Subtitled: 
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The Code of Judicial Conduct 
Canon 7 
A Judge or Candidate for Judicial 
Office Shall Refrain from 
Inappropriate Political Activity. 
[This page is followed by one page of" A judicial candidate shall ... " then by three 
pages of" A judicial candidate shall not ... " and then by another eighteen pages, the last of 


























einOnline -- 35 Ind. L. Rev. 802 2001-2002
"Candidates for judicial office should 
be well aware that they win nothing 
if they win elections by violating 
Canon 7. They can and will be 
disciplined, and the discipline can 
include removal from office." 
Chief Justice Charles T . Wells 
Florida Supreme Court 
July 1, 2000 
For such removal, see In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560,2001 Fla. LEXIS 1581, 
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ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF THE COURTS· 
803 
WHEREAS, the role of the Judiciary is central to the American concepts of justice 
and the rule of law; 
WHEREAS, public trust and confidence in the integrity of the judicial system is 
critical to the effective functioning of the Judiciary; 
WHEREAS, the manner in which campaigns for judicial office are conducted have 
an important impact on public trust and confidence in the judicial system; 
WHEREAS, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that candidates for judicial office 
maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office and act in a manner consistent with 
the independence and integrity of the judiciary; 
WHEREAS, there is evidence of inappropriate and highly acrimonious campaign 
conduct and rhetoric in judicial elections in New York State; 
WHEREAS, the recent Summit on Improving Judicial Selection, attended by 
judicial, legislative and bar leaders from the 17 most populous states with judicial 
el~ctions, identified this trend as posing a substantial threat to public trust and 
confidence in the integrity of the judicial system; 
WHEREAS, the Summit on Improving Judicial Selection issued a Call to Action 
recommending that bar associations addresses [sic] this problem through the 
establishment of judicial campaign conduct committees; 
It is hereby RESOLVED, 
THAT the Administrative Board of the Courts endorses the establishment and 
maintenance by statewide and local bar associations of judicial election campaign 
practices committees that, as part of the bar associations' process of evaluating 
candidates for judicial office, request candidates to provide written commitments that 
they will campaign in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and applicable case law and ethics 
opinions; and 
THAT the Administrative Board of the Courts urges the Chief Judge and Chief 
Administrative Judge to meet with representatives of Statewide and local bar 
associations to discuss the establishment of campaign conduct committees 
throughout the State. 
• Adopted by the Administrative Board of the Courts on March 14,2001. 
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JOINT ORDER OF THE APPELLATE DMSIONS 
The Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court, pursuant to the 
authority vested in them, do hereby amend, effective immediately, 
section 1200.44 of the Disciplinary Rules ofthe Code of Professional 
Responsibility (Title 22 of the Official Compilations of Codes, Rules, 
and Regulations of the State of New York), as follows: 
§1100.44 (DRS-I03) ~wyer Candidate for Judicial Omce 
[(a)] A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office 
shall comply with [the applicable provisions of] section 
100.5 of the Chief AdQJinistrator's Rules Goyeming 
Jydicial Condyct (22 NYCRRl and Cyon 5 ofthe Code 
of Ethical Conduct. 
Joseph P. Sullivan 
Lawrence J. Bracken 
Anthony V. Cardona 
Eugene F. Pigott, Jr. 
Dated: March J 4, 2001 
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I have read the foregoing agreement and Objectives and 
Procedures and I agree to abide by the terms set forth therein. I have 
also requested those persons managing my campaign to familiarize 
themselves with this agreement and to assist in its implementation. 
Dated: 
------ (Candidate's signature) 
(Print name) 
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